The notion about China being factory of the world is changing. Factories in China are shifting their production base to neighboring Asia, primarily because of higher input costs in China, a volatile Chinese exchange rate, Chinese exports being increasingly targeted by its major trading partners, and a fall in price-competitiveness in producing in mainland China. We examine the location substitution effect for China: Chinese firms are exporting primary, intermediate and machinery items, meant for producing final output elsewhere. Results suggest Chinese firms are increasingly substituting their production base outside China.
INTRODUCTION
China is the second largest economy in the world after the US. Trade account for around seventy percent of China's gross domestic product (GDP), making it an important component of national income. The reason for success, especially in trade, has to do with the fact that China imports primary and intermediate goods from neighboring Asia, assembles them in the factories of coastal provinces, such as Guangdong, and transport these assembled products through its port at Hong Kong and Shenzen, to destinations such as in Europe, and the USA. Most of these intermediate inputs are manufactured in Thailand, Myanmar, and Viet Nam, which are finally used for producing Chinese made electronic items. China's trade pattern, which is, maintaining trade surplus with the EU and the US, whereas, maintaining trade deficits with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the ASEAN -supports the proposition that China is "factory of the world." In fact, studies have shown there is an increase in foreign content for Chinese exports. Assembling, and processing of imported inputs meant for re-exports account for about half of China's foreign trade (Hummels et al., 2001; Koopman et al., 2008) . Higher foreign content of its exports is due to vertical intra-industry trade 3 which has grown manifold in China, and possibly may have been responsible for its diverse exports base, from electronics and machinery to textile and apparel (Fukao et al., 2003; Ando, 2006; Gaulier et al., 2007) . However, recently this notion about China being factory of the world is changing. Factories in China are shifting their production base to neighboring Asia, primarily because of higher input costs in China, a volatile Chinese exchange rate, Chinese exports being increasingly targeted by its major trading partners, and a fall in price-competitiveness in producing goods in mainland China. Pushed by these domestic disadvantages and external restrictions, and helped by change in government policy to circumvent such problems, there has been industrial restructuring in the form of diversification of production base of some of the products to cheaper overseas destinations. This has been part of 'going global' strategy that has lead to offshore equity investments and acquisitions. Such an effect relating to the shift in production location from home country to cheaper overseas locations (also known as 'location substitution effect'), is possible for firms in China because their method of production -particularly the low-andmedium technology products that can be easily replicated in other developing countries. If China were to shift its factories outside China, we would expect that China is exporting primary, intermediate and machinery items, to neighboring Asia, and importing finished manufactured items from them. In this paper, we examine this hypothesis, that is, 'location substitution effect' with respect to Chinese investment in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). 4 Although
Chinese companies are investing in countries around the globe, GMS is a natural choice given their geographical proximity to China, and free trade agreements that prevail between countries in the GMS and China. Result suggests China is exporting intermediate inputs and machinery, and in turn expanding manufacturing base in the GMS to produce final manufactured goods there. Similarly, if the 'location substitution effect' is at play, then China's imports from the GMS should ideally comprise of final manufactured items. Our result also supports this.
This aspect about examining 'location substitution effect' has not been considered before, and this study fills this gap. In the light of growing literature commenting about volume, and direction of intra-GMS trade, and GMS trade with China (Banik, 2011) in this paper we focus on the 'location substitution effect' for Chinese firms. Through this study we expect to complement an important aspect of new trade theory, which suggests, a way to explain vertical intra-industry trade is to look at the extent of firm-level heterogeneity. Extent of heterogeneity within any given industry affects outsourcing decision -with high productivity firms sourcing intermediate inputs in international markets, and multinational firms with heterogeneous productivity self-select into different host countries (Helpman, 2006; Castellani et al., 2010; Chen and Moore, 2010) .
Therefore, this study will also help to understand changing nature of international trade and investment linkages. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 documents reasons for China to relocate its production base. Section 3 deals with methodology, and data used for this study. Section 4 contains results. And, we conclude in section 5.
CHINA'S COMPETITIVE DYNAMICS
Before empirically examining the applicability of 'location substitution effect' for the Chinese firms we discuss what are the factors that are motivating the Chinese firms to relocate their production base outside mainland China.
Economic Crisis and the Chinese Exports
The Chinese firms are looking for an alternate production base to evade such protectionist measures.
Given their geographical proximity, the GMS member countries become a natural choice. Figure   1 shows when it comes to imposition of protectionist measures, the ASEAN member countries are much less hostile towards Chinese exports in comparison to the EU, and the US. 
Higher Input Cost
The China growth story is still intact making it a favorable destination among the foreign fund managers. Last year, China has received more foreign fund -much higher than any of other four emerging economies in the BRICS group, comprising of Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa.
The expectation about future appreciation of Chinese renminbi also has been responsible for enhancing inflow of foreign funds. Chinese central bank has been frantically trying to keep renminbi from appreciating further by actively intervening in the foreign exchange market.
Active intervention in the foreign exchange market has resulted in inflation (Zhang, 2009) estimates suggest minimum annual wage rates for Cambodia, Laos, and Viet Nam are US$ 600, US$ 434, and between US$ 1200-1500, respectively. If one were to add the mandatory welfare allowances to the minimum annual wage rates, then the Chinese labor costs are at least double compared to laborers in other regions in south-east Asia (Devonshire-Ellis, 2011). Li and He (2007) provide evidence about foreign fund entering into the real estate sector. What is worrisome is that property prices are rising despite the government having ownership right for land -indicating possible real estate bubble. China has also imposed stricter pollution control norms on its industries, raising the marginal cost of producing goods in China, further.
Hence, Chinese firms stand to gain by shifting production base to the neighboring south-east Asian, with a lower production cost. Also, as Chinese currency has been appreciating since 2005, and with an expectation that it will appreciate further, there is a likelihood of Chinese exports becoming costlier. Chinese firms can gain by importing raw material (as imports become cheaper when currency appreciate), and use this imported raw material to produce finished goods outside
China.
Access to a bigger market
Trade and 
Inflation, Exchange Rate Appreciation and External Price Competitiveness
Rapid economic growth in China over the last two decades has been accompanied by a surge in foreign capital inflows both in current and capital accounts (the 'twin surpluses'), causing a massive accumulation of foreign exchange reserve (US$ 2.65 trillion by September 2010).
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Accumulation of foreign exchange reserve has its own risks, including the cost of holding in low yielding financial assets of foreign governments. Before the global economic crisis started, China has invested a major portion of their trade surplus in US dollars and Euro-denominated assets.
Values of these assets are now falling because of Federal Reserve in the US, and European
Central Bank in the EU, are printing too much money. In fact, USA is investing in assets in China, and other emerging economies in Asia through Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) route, thereby exporting inflation (Banik, 2011) . The EU, and the US still remain the largest investors in China. Such investment is leading to accumulation of foreign currencies, making it difficult for the Chinese monetary authority to prevent growth of 'excess liquidity'. A part of this excess liquidity is finding its way into the Chinese stock market, further accelerating inflation (Li and He, 2007) . In fact, for the period between 1980 and 2002, pass through effect of exchange rate translating into higher domestic price was much less in comparison to the period after 2002 (Yu, 2007 (Amiti, and Freund, 2008) . The fall in price competitiveness has also motivated Chinese firms to relocate their production base outside China. In addition to, higher inflation rates and interest rates, the Chinese renminbi has also become more volatile. Once the longstanding peg to the US dollar was abandoned in July 2005, the renminibi-dollar exchange rate has shot-up, appreciating by about 20 percent, (Figure 2 ). Note: Volatility is calculated using (a) the standard deviation of the first difference of the log of monthly exchange rate (SDld), and (b) the moving average standard deviation (MASD) of the log of (monthly) exchange rate. Such measures have been used for studying the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports (See Tenreyro, 2007; Chit et al., 2010) .
Exchange rate volatility can have negative effect on international trade, directly through uncertainty and adjustment cost, and indirectly through its effect on allocation of resources (Côte, 1994) .
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Trade flows are usually explained using the gravity model. The original application of the Newtonian law of gravity in the field of economics goes back to the work of Tinbergen (1962) , Poyhonen (1963), and Linnemann (1966) suggesting that bilateral trade between two nations is positively related to their national income and inversely related to the distance between them.
Although backed by little economical underpinning, these early models became popular because of their prognostic nature in explaining trade flow. Later, however, economists have worked on building a theoretical (microeconomic) foundation for the gravity model (Anderson 1979; Bergstrand 1985; Deardorff 1998 …… (2) where, is total exports from country i within GMS to ROW at time period t, whereas, world GDP, which is a proxy for world demand for GMS exports. Likewise, demand for imports from ROW also depends upon economic condition in the GMS. It is captured through , referring to GDP of ith country within GMS. γ ,…, 4 γ , are positives and less than unity it imply, a rise in GMS trade with ROW of the world will also be reflected through a rise in trade with China.
However, for each percentage point increase in trade with China, GMS trade with ROW to increase less than proportionately. In case the coefficients are negatives and less than unity, it imply a rise in trade with China is coming at the expense of a fall in trade in ROW. If location substitution effect is at play, we would expect either of these two things to happen, suggesting the importance of China in the GMS trade.
Coming back to the model, in a panel framework, the term captures both country specific (cross sectional) and temporal effects at time t. A general expression for is: = γ + α j + μ t +η i,j,t , where,
can be thought of as a country specific intercept; μ t capture time effect, and η i,j,t the overall purely random disturbance term. 9 The combined, time, and country specific fixed effect terms eliminate an omitted variables bias arising both from unobserved variables that are constant over time and from unobserved variables that are constant across countries. So we use country specific dummies to capture individual country characteristics. As we consider all the countries within GMS there is no necessity to undertake random effect modeling (where it is assumed we are randomly selecting few sample countries from the GMS 9 We use j-1 dummies to avoid dummy variable trap. population). 10 As N in our case is small (cross sectional elements comprise of five different countries), the dynamic panel approach of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation techniques, which are expected to yield more consistent estimates in presence of infinite N, are also not considered. 10 In fact, fixed effect and random effect are going to yield similar results when all samples in the population are used for regression. 11 For more on the application of GMM techniques in the context of gravity equation see Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . This is a widely acknowledged use of GMM techniques in the presence of a lower number of N which may increase the finite sample bias. China, the coefficient is negative, and less than unity, suggesting that for each percentage increase in trade with China, there will be a fall in trade with ROW. For the final manufactured exports to China the coefficient is positive but is less than unity. Most of the office machines and electrical machineries that Thailand exports, and most of the motorcycles that Viet Nam sells are made with Chinese machinery inputs. Similarly, we find evidence in favor of trade happening in primary and resource base items. China is a major buyer of energy and food items from the GMS region. Laos has been supplying hydroelectric power to China, Viet Nam has been supplying petroleum and petrol products to China, and Cambodia and Myanmar supplying agricultural and meat items to China. Similarly, China is exporting primary items like textile yarn -an input for manufacturing garments in Cambodia and Myanmar (Banik, 2011) . In fact, with respect to primary and resource base trade, the coefficients in both the equations are negative: suggesting that for each percentage increase in GMS trade with China, there will be a fall in trade with ROW. The growth in intra-industry trade in all three categories, sometime at the expense of GMS trade with ROW, reveals the importance of China in GMS trade.
RESULTS
Coefficients related to the world GDP, and GDP of the GMS countries, are statistically significant, and greater than unity. It suggests that the tradables in these regions are income elastics, something that is true for the white capital good items. We do not find evidence about exchange rate to be a significant factor driving GMS imports although it is significant in the case of exports. The insignificant coefficient in the imports function may be because of the fact that most of the trade between China and some of the GMS countries such as Viet Nam and Laos, takes place in Chinese currencies, and not in US dollars (Banik, 2011) . In general, the country dummies are statistically significant, again suggesting the importance of China in GMS trade.
CONCLUSION
Our results provide evidence about growing intra-industry trade in intermediate machinery items, and final manufactured goods between China and the GMS countries. This may be because of an increase in vertical intra-industry trade between China and GMS countries, involving back-andforth transaction in vertically fragmented cross-border production process. We also find evidence which support complementarities in primary and resource based trade. Complementarities exist in terms of trade in energy, and food items. Increase income in China has resulted in increase demand for food, meat, and clothing -things that are supplied particularly by Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia. For instance, Chinese firms are investing in garment manufacturing units in Cambodia and Myanmar. Instances such as in case of garments, and a growing intra-industry trade in intermediate and final manufactured items, suggest that China is shifting their production base outside mainland China. This is mainly because of higher cost of producing in mainland China (resulting from higher labor, land, and energy prices); and Chinese exports being increasingly targeted by its major trading partners. Chinese firms are circumventing these constraints by shifting their production base to cheaper overseas destination such as in GMS countries. From the policy perspective, Chinese government also stands to gain from such cross border trade and investment decision. Such an investment will not only guarantee access to a more wider market in the ASEAN region, and to rest of the world, but will also imply a more balanced regional growth for China. It is to be noted, that the two provinces, Guangxi and Yunnan of China, which are part of GMS are relatively less developed in comparison to coastal China. A deeper integration with GMS will mean a balance regional growth for China. The integration with GMS comes out natural because of closer proximity to mainland China, better policy coordination among the governments of the GMS countries, and availability of similar technology to replicate medium technology products outside mainland China. 
